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737 Max grounding tests Southwest's relationship with Boeing - Southwest Airlines CEO Looking at Airbus A220
Southwest isn't just a customer to Boeing. It has closely guided the 737's incremental development (www.fliegerfaust.com) المزيد...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
This would be a terrible decision on Southwest to break the unmatched success of the airline that is nearly directly related to it's Boeing 737 family, fleet commonality. The 737 has been instrumental in making Southwest the world's foremost LCC, in profitability for more straight quarters than any other airline I can think of. The 737 is a marvel of an aircraft, and as we've moved from classic to NG and now to MAX, the fundamental flying characteristics of the aircraft have gotten even better, while retaining a better efficiency and weight that the A320NEO family. While Airbus plays around with "UULLRRs" by creating "flying gas tanks" that sacrifice passengers and cargo for fuel, just to fly a bit further, Boeing makes aircraft that perform their stated capability, everyday, every route, every flight, and the upcoming MAX-10 will be no different it the route optimization it was designed for. I'm am truly sorry to the lost brothers and sisters from the recent, unfortunate crashes, and I say that as someone who lives in Indonesia most of the year and has flown Lion, so I truly say that with sincerity, but there is nothing wrong with the MAX as an amazing aircraft. MCAS is another system that can be manipulated from the ground (research Serco,) like GECAS and engine monitoring, and to think that ANY software developer doesn't have a back door, usually accessible by the ultra corrupt within geo-political ICs is just inability to realize the potential for terrible "accidents" to happen due to the never ending push for more and more automation. Regardless of what one thinks of my last statement, it is still "over-automation" that allowed for these crashes to be possible, and with all due respect to Airbus fans (as we are all lovers of aviation,) Airbus has been the heavier promoter of automation in the cockpit over the years, especially with their video-game side-stick. We need to let pilots be pilots again, not computer savvy babysitters in the sky. Think of how many and how long, the 737-300 worked out for Southwest. Was their ultra-long running workhorse that would have probably flown many more cycles if the maintenance was economically viable. The MAX is even better, but sadly automation has reached the point where we've had unnecessary tragedy. Too close together, and both brand new aircraft that went down. The odds of those facts alone, are close to winning the super lotto. Something is NOT right here.
You may want to have a look at this squawk to see exactly what is wrong with the B38M and B39M. There is an inherent design flaw that Boeing tried to fix with software, which is more prone to error than actually fixing the design flaw.
https://flightaware.com/squawks/view/linked/email/alert/72846/
Come back after seeing that discussion and see if you still stick to your sentiment that there is nothing wrong with the B38M and B39M.
https://flightaware.com/squawks/view/linked/email/alert/72846/
Come back after seeing that discussion and see if you still stick to your sentiment that there is nothing wrong with the B38M and B39M.
I always enjoy a good aviation discussion, and with sincerity and attentiveness, I read the article that you have linked in it's entirety. Let me also say first, that like most of us here, I've been an aviation mega-enthusiast since I was a single digit age, and while I never had the ability (life circumstances [mostly money,]) to be a certified pilot (yet, hopefully,) I have worked in and around aircraft, both in private security at OAK, and doing ramp for an old ATI 762 freighter conversion. Point being, please don't ever see anything I talk about with anyone as an argument, but a "discussion," instead. I am open minded and always ready and willing to learn and hear all perspectives with my biases aside, with any aspect of life, and especially in my passion for aviation. So anything I say, I must declare as opinion, even though that likely goes without saying anyway.
My original comment actually alluded to what ended up being on of the very last lines in that article...
"It doesn’t need to be “fixed” with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed altogether."
Well, I agree with that statement completely. The reason I used the 733 as an example in my original comment was to illustrate that Boeing has already put in the money, time and effort to show that the engines could indeed be moved forward, with a redesigned, oddly shaped nacelle, and still prove (for probably the most flights ever recorded on any particular variant of any narrow-body, commercial aircraft,) that flight was safe, controllable, comfortably manageable for pilots, and profitable for wise airlines (like Southwest) who utilized the type in large numbers, not to mention a hit with otherwise uninterested in aviation (in general,) customers of Southwest's product, which has always been the magic of flight at a cost that the common man/woman could afford, with the basic knowledge of safety that flying was statistically safer than driving their car to the airport.
I believe that over-automation IS the problem, and what I meant when I said that there is nothing wrong with the MAX. What I should have said (yes, my fault,) was that there is nothing wrong with the evolution of aircraft efficiency in a general sense, except for the doors that have now been opened by over-automation. In that article, it also mentions, albeit in different wording, my similar sentiment that pilots should be pilots, and giving such a demanding power over flight to software coders on the ground, who have little to no general interest in aviation, is a terrible idea, and that for Boeing to bear the blame, solely for that phenomenon is unfair, because all modern, commercial aircraft now rely on software by these coder on the ground. My greater point is that the door that this opens is extremely dangerous to the core principles of aviation and aviators. The pilot of an aircraft full of human lives that he/she is responsible for, should absolutely zero ability for anyone on the ground, ever, to manipulate control of that aircraft, be it in real time (which is absolutely possible,) and in software coding in general. This is extremely dangerous, because not only does that pen a window of possibility for mistakes, it opens the door for corrupt manipulation.
I am no expert in aviation accident investigation, which you will be the first to point out, admittedly, but I spent a good portion of my life as an investigator before I got into the private security detail field. What I am trained in and good at is general knowledge of reading people. With that said, what I've been noticing lately, and not even by choice, as my phone and every other electronic device that I have (yes, another hobby,) has been pumping out "This is the end of Boeing" type propaganda now, daily, sometimes several times per day. Article after article making sure to drive a narrative that Boeing screwed up. Anytime I see our mainstream propaganda outlets pushing a theory out with such vigor, effort and repetitiveness, I tend to believe that the answer is something else. ANYthng else. When two brand new aircraft go down, killing all on board, in a matter of just a 6-month period, whereas the aviation investigator goes straight for the black box and the aircraft related evidence, my brain works toward a different angle. I go straight for the passenger manifests, both of the ultimately doomed flights and of the flight with pilot reported problems before the doomed flight. I sift through patterns and statistical odds. Something about all of this, doesn't pass the smell test for me. Not by a long-shot. That does not mean however, that I'm not paying attention to and respecting the aviation investigators at all. Maybe you think I sound crazy, and no offense taken if you do, but there is a piece of this puzzle that we are being kept from, IMO, and I just don't know what that is yet.
I will conclude by saying that I am not giving Boeing and the 737MAX a free pass, but I do believe that whatever we are dealing with here was inevitable at some point, during this expediency of over-automation in commercial aircraft, and in this particular case, it just so happens to be the MAX-8 that took the fall. (Absolutely no pun intended.) We could go on all day about heavy, too-far forward engines offsetting the AOA, but it is of my opinion that it goes deeper than that, and it's all related to very line that I've quoted from the article you linked me to.
My original comment actually alluded to what ended up being on of the very last lines in that article...
"It doesn’t need to be “fixed” with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed altogether."
Well, I agree with that statement completely. The reason I used the 733 as an example in my original comment was to illustrate that Boeing has already put in the money, time and effort to show that the engines could indeed be moved forward, with a redesigned, oddly shaped nacelle, and still prove (for probably the most flights ever recorded on any particular variant of any narrow-body, commercial aircraft,) that flight was safe, controllable, comfortably manageable for pilots, and profitable for wise airlines (like Southwest) who utilized the type in large numbers, not to mention a hit with otherwise uninterested in aviation (in general,) customers of Southwest's product, which has always been the magic of flight at a cost that the common man/woman could afford, with the basic knowledge of safety that flying was statistically safer than driving their car to the airport.
I believe that over-automation IS the problem, and what I meant when I said that there is nothing wrong with the MAX. What I should have said (yes, my fault,) was that there is nothing wrong with the evolution of aircraft efficiency in a general sense, except for the doors that have now been opened by over-automation. In that article, it also mentions, albeit in different wording, my similar sentiment that pilots should be pilots, and giving such a demanding power over flight to software coders on the ground, who have little to no general interest in aviation, is a terrible idea, and that for Boeing to bear the blame, solely for that phenomenon is unfair, because all modern, commercial aircraft now rely on software by these coder on the ground. My greater point is that the door that this opens is extremely dangerous to the core principles of aviation and aviators. The pilot of an aircraft full of human lives that he/she is responsible for, should absolutely zero ability for anyone on the ground, ever, to manipulate control of that aircraft, be it in real time (which is absolutely possible,) and in software coding in general. This is extremely dangerous, because not only does that pen a window of possibility for mistakes, it opens the door for corrupt manipulation.
I am no expert in aviation accident investigation, which you will be the first to point out, admittedly, but I spent a good portion of my life as an investigator before I got into the private security detail field. What I am trained in and good at is general knowledge of reading people. With that said, what I've been noticing lately, and not even by choice, as my phone and every other electronic device that I have (yes, another hobby,) has been pumping out "This is the end of Boeing" type propaganda now, daily, sometimes several times per day. Article after article making sure to drive a narrative that Boeing screwed up. Anytime I see our mainstream propaganda outlets pushing a theory out with such vigor, effort and repetitiveness, I tend to believe that the answer is something else. ANYthng else. When two brand new aircraft go down, killing all on board, in a matter of just a 6-month period, whereas the aviation investigator goes straight for the black box and the aircraft related evidence, my brain works toward a different angle. I go straight for the passenger manifests, both of the ultimately doomed flights and of the flight with pilot reported problems before the doomed flight. I sift through patterns and statistical odds. Something about all of this, doesn't pass the smell test for me. Not by a long-shot. That does not mean however, that I'm not paying attention to and respecting the aviation investigators at all. Maybe you think I sound crazy, and no offense taken if you do, but there is a piece of this puzzle that we are being kept from, IMO, and I just don't know what that is yet.
I will conclude by saying that I am not giving Boeing and the 737MAX a free pass, but I do believe that whatever we are dealing with here was inevitable at some point, during this expediency of over-automation in commercial aircraft, and in this particular case, it just so happens to be the MAX-8 that took the fall. (Absolutely no pun intended.) We could go on all day about heavy, too-far forward engines offsetting the AOA, but it is of my opinion that it goes deeper than that, and it's all related to very line that I've quoted from the article you linked me to.
And the negotiations for a discount with Boeing begin.
I fly internationally for the most part. When flying within country, Southwest is my ONLY carrier. Should this a/c get approved to fly again, I'll seek an alternate airline unless I know that I can book a flight on an other than MAX a/c. Living in upstate NY, the situation is bleak, as I don't fly American or United. I guess we'll see how this turns out.
i will also add that the MAX series should never have been granted an Airworthiness Certificate, IMO.